THE AMERICAN
LAW REGISTER ANDREVIEW
PvBLITSHED MONTHLY BY MEMBERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LAW oP

THE TJNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.
Advisory Committee:

HAMPTON L. CARSON, Chairman.
GEORGE TUCKER BISPHAI,
ERSKINE HAZARD DICKSON.
GEORGE STUART PATTERSON,

GEORGE WHARTON PEPPER,

9I.LIAM STRUTHERS ELLIS,

WILLIA-

DRA

R ILEWIS.

Editors:
WAI4TER CAZUNOVE. DOUGLAS, JR., Editor-in-Chief.

DILWORT1 P. HIBBERD, Treasurer.
ROGER ASHHURST,
74ALCOLM LLOYD,
ARTHUR G. DICKSON,

FRANCIS S. McIHENNIqY,

ROLAIJI R. VOUIKE,
W. MEREDITH HAINA
WILLIAM B. LINW,

JOSEPH A. MCKEON,
OWEN J. EOBERTS.
ROY W. WHITE.

SUBSCRIPT;ON PRCE, $3.00 PER ANjqUM.

SINGLPE COPIES,

Address all literay comxuunicatiqns to the EZDrTos-iNwCm

35

CENTS.

Fp; all business com-

munications to the TREASURER., Department of Iaw, University of Pennsylvania,
Sixth and Chestnut Streets, Philadelphia, Pa.
PERPETUITIES. The Rule agaipst Perpetuities is not often brought
to the attention of the attorney, but the questions arising under it are
sometimes of great importance, as witness the attacks on the Girard
and Franklin bequests, and the recent case of Pulitzerv. Livingston,

in Maine, 36 Ati. Rep. 635 (1897).

Pulitzerv. Livingston was an action brought for an alleged breach
of a special covenant that the grantors in certain deeds of trust had
remaining in them no title which could be maintained against the
title conveyed to the plaintiff by the grantees. The plaintiff claimed
that these deeds of trust were not legally sufficient to divest the
grantors of their title in the property, that there were future estates
and interests so limited therein that they offend against those rules
of law which prescribe and limit the period within which future
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estates and interests must necessarily vest, and that these deeds
being void no title ever passed to the trustees but still remains in
the grantors, or their heirs or assigns.
The facts were these: William Bingham, of Philadelphia, and
United States Senator from Pennsylvania, in the last century, was
the owner of very large landed estates, including over two million
acres in Maine alone. In 1853, his heirs were so numerous and so
scattered that it was not feasible for them to make conveyances
directly or to act through agents appointed by letter of attorney;
deeds of conveyance in trust were therefore executed to Joseph R.
Ingersoll, then the American Minister to England and one of the
most distinguished members of the old Bar of Philadelphia, and
John Craig Miller, as trustees. The trustees were empowered,
interalia, (I) to let, demise and mortgage the real estate and
invest and reinvest the personal estate; (2) to collect and receive
the rents and income of the real estate and the income from the
personal estate under their control; (3) to remit the net income*
to the grantors or apply and dispose of the same as the grantors or
their representatives might direct; (4) to appoint successors in the
trust. The power was expressly reserved to the grantors and their
legal representatives, at any time, to alter or revoke the trusts as to
their respective shares. From this it appears that the beneficial
enjoyment of the estate is absolutely and unqualifiedly vested in the
original holders of the legal title or their representatives, with full
power of sale and disposition; that the trustees have, during the
continuance of the trust, the fullest powers of sale and conveyance;
and that all the cestuis que trustent, as to the whole, or each, as to
his own purpart, may change or terminate the trust and require a
conveyance of the legal estate.
The terms of this trust have been set forth at some length, as it
involves property-rights of unusual magnitude, and the case is one
that may well become an important authority. It is of interest,
too, from its involving the soundness of the reasoning in Slade v.
Patten, 68 Me. 38o. This last case, it may be recalled, is one of
four in the United States criticised in Gray on the Rule against
Pereuities (Sections 235-6) as in "conflict with the fundamental
principles which govern questions of remoteness."
Pulitzerv. Livingston was very fully argued and elaborate briefs
were submitted, especially on behalf of the defendant. The textbooks-Marsden, Lewis and. Gray-were cited at length, and all
the available decisions brought to the attention of the court. The
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opinion is full and clear. It recognizes distinctly the essential
difference, so often overlooked, in the uses of the word "perpetuity"
-now, strictly, with reference to remoteness of vesting, and again,
more loosely, with reference to a perpetual prevention of alienation
or restraint upon it. The two uses are well shown in such cases as
Philadelhiav. Girard'sHeirs, 45 Pa. 26, and Fosdick v. Fosdick,
6 Allen 41, which are referred to in the opinion. In the judgment
of the court the deeds of trust in this case do not offend against
either the Rule against Perpetuities or the Rule against Restraints
on Alienation. All the interests, whether legal or equitable, are
vested and all are freely alienable. The very purpose, indeed, of
the trusts was to promote the alienability of the subject-matter.
The fact that they may continue indefinitely does not militate
against them, for a legal fee is indeterminate, as well as is an
equitable one, and the same rule applies to one as to the other.
The power of revocation reserved to the grantors is relied upon
by the court as a further and conclusive ground for sustaining the
trust. This destructibility of the estate, at the will of the. present
owner alone, reduces all the future interests contained therein to the
level of present estates and is by itself sufficient to prevent their
being obnoxious to the Rule against Perpetuities.
The objection to the indefinite duration of the trustees' power to
sell is answered in the same way :-" It is true that if an unlimited
indestructible power to sell exists, it does restrain free alienation by
the one who, subject to that power, is the owner of the fee," and
thus offend against the Rule against Restraints on Alienation. But
the right reserved to destroy the power renders the power valid,
although in terms perpetual: 2 Sugd. Pow. 472.
This brings the court to a discussion of the case of Slade v. Patten,
68 Me. 38o, already mentioned. Here there was no reservation of
a power of revocation-"a most important difference."
The
reasons given for the decision are severely criticised and the
ground upon which it is apparently based, viz., "that a trust which
will not or may not terminate within lives in being and twenty-one
years and a fraction afterwards is void as creating a perpetuity," is
declared incorrect and not to be sustained on principle or authority.
It is pointed out, however, that the judgment was in itself correct.
The court then adverts to the cases in Maryland which follow the
dictum of the reasoning in Slade v. Patten and expresses its
disapproval of them.
This decision of the Supreme Court of Maine is the more
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important as it effectually discards the former opinion of the samecourt, which had been generally recognized as anomalous, and thus.
tends to restore a substantial unanimity of view hpon this subject.
The opinion in which this is done is so well reasoned and amply
supported by authority and the interests involved were of such
importance, that we may fairly expect Pulitzer v. Livingston to
take rank as a leading case in this difficult branch of the law.

In the Travelers Insurance Company of
ACCIDENT INSURANCE.
Har#ford v. W. -Y Randol h, Executor, not yet reported, the
action was upon policies of insurance issued to one Mitchell, by the
insurance company. The policy exempted the company for injuries
caused by "voluntary exposure to danger," on the part of the
insured. The defence set up that Mitchell voluntarily exposed
himself to unnecessary danger by riding upon the steps of a railroad
car while the train was proceeding at the rate of twenty-five miles
an hour, and that having fallen thence and been killed, the plaintiff
(his executor) could not maintain an action upon the policy. The
defendant moved for a peremptory instruction in his favor, which
was refused, and a verdict found for the plaintiff. On appeal, Mr.
Justice Harlan, delivering the opinion of the court, in affirming a
judgment for the plaintiff, said:
"But the defendant's motive for a peremptory instruction
distinctly presented the question, whether riding upon the platform
of a car running fifteen to twenty-five or thirty miles an hour, even
if the passenger while so riding holds to a railing, and thereby
diminishes the danger of being thrown from the car, was, within
the meaning of the policy and as matter of law a voluntary exposure
of himself to unnecessary danger.
"The words ' voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger,' literally
interpreted, would embrace every exposure of the assured not
actually required by the circumstances of his situation or enforced
by the superior will of others, as well as every danger attending
such exposure, that might have been avoided by the exercise of
care and diligence upon his part. But the same words may be
fairly interpreted as referring only to dangers of a real substantive
character, which the insured recognized, but to which he, nevertheless, purposely and cautiously exposed himself, intending at the
the time to assume all the risks of the situation. The latter interpretation is most favorable to the assured, does no violence to the
words used, is consistent with the object of accident insurance
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contracts, and is, therefore, the interpretation which the court
should adopt."
The action of deceased, although unnecessary, was not in itself,
and as a matter of law, a voluntary exposure to danger within the
meaning of the contract.
The court further said: "The contract in suit *coversthe injury
or death of the assured from all external causes and accidental
means. Bodily injury or death resulting from the carelessness of
the assured is not excepted from the contract.'
The negligence of
the deceased was insured against, as Weil As other causes of injury
ot death.
WILL--LATENT AiIBIGUITY.

In Wampvle's Estate, 3 Pa, Supe-

tior Ct. 414, the testator left a will containing the following residuary clause: "I give and bequeath the remainder of my estate, if
any, to the Trumbauersville Church, td be used for the general
benefit of said church." Two religious bodies claimed the benefit
of this clause.
Christ's Evangelical Lutheran Church of Trumbauersville and
the German Reformed Church of Trumbauersville, both incorporated bodies, owned their church building in common, and both
bodies used it as a house of worship, pursuant to a written agreement which contained, inter alia, the following: While the congregations have unitedly contributed in church building, etc., it is
therefore decided that both shall have equal rights and privileges of
the same. ' Each congregation is entitled to one-half of the time
for use of the church, alternately, one Sunday after the other. In
case of funerals, the one first announced through the church bell
shall have first privileges. The cemetery is free for every regular
member of either congregation to bury therein. Those that are
not members or have not contributed to their support within two
years, and wish to bury in this cemetery, must pay from two to five
dollars fier grave, according to its size. The money thus accumulating shall be for the mutual benefit of both congregations.
In the lower court it was held (17 C. C. R. 597) that the legacy
should go to two bodies in possession and control of the Trumbauersville Church building as trustees. Christ's Evangelical
Lutheran Church appealed from the decree on the ground that
there was a latent ambiguity, and that therefore evidence dehors the
will should be admitted to explain the terms used. The Appellate
Court reversed the decree.
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It is a settled doctrine that as a latent ambiguity is only disclosed
by extrinsic evidence, it may be removed by extrinsic evidence.
Such ambiguity may arise upon a will either when it names a person
as the object of a gift or a thing as the subject of it, and there are
two persons or things that answer such name or description ; or,
secondly, it may arise when the will contains a misdescription of
the object or subject, as where there is no such person or thing in
existence, or, if in existence, the person is not the one intended, or
the thing does not belong to the testator: _Patch v. White, Ii7 U.
S. 210-227. In this case there is undoubtedly in existence such an
object as the Trumbauersville Church. The term church is applied,
especially in country districts, to a building and appointments used
for religious purposes quite as frequently as to a religious body or
organization. The Trumbauersville Church could have been a
legatee or devisee, for the bequest could have been received by the
whole body as an unincorporated association or society to hold it
upon a trust, as for charitable purposes: Tucker et a. v. Seamen's
Aid Society et al., 7 Metc. 188.
In the face of these considerations it appears somewhat doubtful
that any ambiguity existed as to the meaning of the disputed terms,
and it is submitted that it was improper to allow the introduction
of extrinsic evidence.

